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Episodic memories differ from other types of memory
because they represent aspects of the past not present
in other memories, such as the time, place, or social
context in which the memories were formed. Focus on
phenomenal experience in human memory, such as the
sense of ‘having been there’, has resulted in conceptuali-
zations of episodic memory that are difficult or impossible
to apply to nonhuman species. It is therefore a significant
challenge for investigators to agree on objective behav-
ioral criteria that can be applied in nonhuman animals
and still capture features of memory thought to be critical
in humans. Some investigators have attempted to use
neurobiological parallels to bridge this gap; however,
defining memory types on the basis of the brain structures
involved rather than on identified cognitive mechanisms
risks missing crucial functional aspects of episodic
memory, which are ultimately behavioral. The most pro-
ductive way forward is likely a combination of neurobi-
ology and sophisticated cognitive testing that identifies
the mental representations present in episodic memory.
Investigators that have refined their approach from asking
the naı¨ve question ‘‘do nonhuman animals have episodic
memory’’ to instead asking ‘‘what aspects of episodic
memory are shared by humans and nonhumans’’ are
making progress.
Introduction
Memory is not a single thing: our apparently seamless expe-
riences of remembering result from the combined action of
cognitively and neurobiologically distinguishable systems in
the brain. These distinct systems have evolved because
they each serve specialized functions that have promoted
survival and reproduction [1]. One type of memory is
episodic memory, which enables use of contextual informa-
tion about distinct episodes from one’s personal past to
guide behavior. For example, you might remember loading
ripe tomatoes and watermelon for a barbecue on the super-
market checkout belt while reading about the anti-cancer
properties of a plant in a tabloid headline. In this case,
contextual information about where and when you formed
a memory is useful in discriminating facts learned reading
tabloids from facts learned during a trip to the botanical
gardens. By contrast, semantic memories lack contextual
details: you may know that monkeys have tails, but prob-
ably do not remember the occasion on which you learned
this fact. The distinction between episodic and semantic
memory in humans is central in cognitive neuroscience
and has been well-established by the combination of
behavioral studies, neuroimaging studies, and studies of
patients with brain damage [2]. The extent to which these
specific memory systems exist in nonhumans is debated.
Some cognitive scientists argue that episodic memory
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(R.R.H.)memory is often defined using criteria based in human
conscious experience that are difficult or impossible to
apply in nonhumans [3,4].
Comparative psychologists and neurobiologists who
study the evolutionary and mechanistic relations among
memory systems across species generally define episodic
memory in terms that can be operationalized in objective
studies with nonverbal species. Studies of memory in
nonhuman animals have resulted in a rich set of methodolo-
gies, findings and perspectives. Mapping specific perfor-
mances in nonhumans to human episodic memory remains
controversial, but there is no doubt that our understanding
of memory in humans and nonhumans is advancing. Here,
we shall highlight some of the problems inherent in studying
episodic memory in nonhumans and use selected examples
to illustrate distinct perspectives and demonstrate progress.
Central to our review is acceptance of the idea that episodic
memories have distinct functional properties not found in
other memory systems. It is possible to dissociate episodic
memories from other types of memory based on the
particular features of events that are mentally represented
and the neurobiological systems that instantiate these
representations [5,6]. These dissociations become possible
when we design experiments based on the question, ‘‘what
can an animal with episodic memory do that one without it
cannot do?’’
Moving beyond Anthropocentrism and Phenomenology
The term ‘episodic memory’ was coined by Endel Tulving
in 1972 to describe a type of human memory, and was
elaborated to apply to memory of autobiographical events
resulting from ‘mental time travel’ associated with self-
awareness or ‘autonoesis’ [3]. The first efforts to search
for episodic memory in nonhuman species were therefore
necessarily anthropocentric and faced the potentially
insurmountable problem of mapping the objective perfor-
mance of nonhuman animals in memory tests to human
reports of the phenomenology of remembering. Debate
continues about whether nonhuman animals ‘mentally
travel in time’ and experience autonoesis [4,7], and these
debates can shift attention away from the well-designed
objective studies of nonhuman memory that yield prog-
ress (Figure 1). However, to the extent that these and
similar phenomenology-rich conceptualizations of memory
can be objectively operationalized, they will stimulate
progress by challenging experimentalists to design better
studies.
Natural selection has resulted in differentmemory systems
because of the distinct functional roles these systems play in
the service of overt behavior, not because of differences in
the way these memories are phenomenally experienced.
Nonetheless, some students of nonhumanmemory continue
to struggle with definitions of memory systems that empha-
size phenomenology and private experience, arguing that
‘‘the main ingredient missing [in studies of episodic memory
in nonhumans] is autonoetic consciousness’’ [4]. This prob-
lem was famously sidestepped with the term ‘episodic-like’
to describe some memory in nonhumans [8]. Whatever
terminology is used, progress will be most rapid when we
define memory systems in entirely functional terms that
can be objectively operationalized in behavioral experiments
with a variety of species. As Bertrand Russell is believed to
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Figure 1. Constellation of mnemonic features
of episodic memory.
Mnemonic features are grouped within
the phenomenological, neurobiological, and
cognitive behavioral approaches. Some areas
of potential overlap are indicated. These are
meant to be representative examples; there
exist more mnemonic features, and more ap-
proaches, than could be depicted here. Future
research might be directed at creating more
overlap in the research domains indicated by
the bubbles.
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the problem in a way that will allow a solution.’’
Neurobiological Approaches
Neurobiological manipulations can establish correspon-
dences between specific memory capacities and specific
neurobiological systems. Episodic memories in humans are
particularly dependent on the integrity of the hippocampus
and related structures, while other kinds of memory are not
[9]. Because human episodic memory is known to be depen-
dent on the hippocampus, determining which nonhuman
memories are dependent on the hippocampus is one
approach taken to episodic memory in nonhumans. After
encountering a list of five odors in sequence, rats with hippo-
campal lesions were unable to report which odor occurred
earlier in the list. By contrast, these rats could still correctly
recognize whether an odor was familiar from having been
presented during study and could discriminate one odor
from another [10]. This dissociation of memory for order
from the ability to recognize items parallels findings from
humans, where hippocampal-dependent episodic memory
is dissociated from other types of memory [11]. Similarly,
monkeys with fornix transections, which disrupt one of
two major afferent-efferent pathways of the hippocampus,
were unable to make accurate recency judgments [12].
Subsequent lesion studies [13] and pharmacological inacti-
vation studies suggest that, in the hippocampus, area CA3
and the dentate gyrus (DG) rapidly encode spatial separa-
tion, whereas area CA1 encodes temporal order (for
example [14]).
Determining the extent to which similar kinds of neural
processing, representing similar aspects of memory, occuracross species is a powerful method
for establishing correspondences in
memory systems. Whereas removal
and inactivation of brain systems pro-
vide strong causal evidence regarding
the locations of brain functions, elec-
trophysiological recordings provide
information about how processing in
specific areas might be carried out.
The representation of the spatio-tem-
poral structure of sequences of events
in hippocampal neural ensembles may
be conserved across species (for
review see [15]). During an odor-order
test based on the one described above,
themagnitudeof changes inpatterns of
rat hippocampal ensembles predicted
memory performance [16].Specific ensembles have been shown to encode specific
memories and likely the passage of time [17]. The lateral pre-
frontal cortex (PFC) in monkeys [18] and medial PFC in rats
[19] also encode temporal order. Neural ensembles in the
hippocampus have been found to ‘replay’ events encoun-
tered during spatial navigation tasks, with place cells firing
in the same order during rest and sleep as they had when
rats traveled a particular route. Similarly, the same neurons
in the human hippocampus fire when subjects watch movie
scenes and later recall them [20]. Disruption of this neural
replay in rats impaired performance in a delayed alternation
test, suggesting that reactivation of neural ensembles under-
lies memory for places recently visited [21]. Evidence that
hippocampal cells in rodents encode time is accumulating
[13,22], but it is still a challenge to establish direct parallels
with humans, from whom relevant electrophysiological
data are rarely collected. Less direct parallels are seen
in human functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
studies in which tests of temporal order result in activation
of the hippocampus [23]. To the extent that discriminating
the temporal order and locations in which events occurred
are functional properties of episodic memory, these studies
provide strong evidence for a homologous episodic memory
function of the hippocampus among humans, monkeys, and
rodents.
Cognitive Behavioral Approaches
Neurobiological studies of memory focus on identifying the
brain areas and neural processes responsible for memory.
Cognitive studies complement this work by establishing
in more detail which aspects of events are represented,
or stored, in the brain and how this information controls
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Figure 2. Temporal order memory test for
monkeys.
The images around the perimeter depict the
stages in this behavioral test; the graph in
the middle depicts typical results from aver-
aging thousands of test trials. Trials began
when the monkey touched the green square.
The monkey then touched five trial-unique
images presented one after the other. After a
short delay, the monkey chose between a
randomly selected pair of images from the
list (here images 2 and 3; a ‘2, 3’ test). Select-
ing the image that had appeared earlier in the
study list was rewarded with a positive sound
and a food pellet in the reward trough. The
graph in center shows accuracy in tests with
pairs of images from each combination of
study list positions. Accuracy was higher for
tests consisting of pairs that were widely
separated in the study list (symbolic distance)
and for images that were near the end of the
list (recency). The dashed line indicates the
accuracy expected if the monkey were guess-
ing. Monkeys remembered the order in which
images appeared, demonstrating an impor-
tant property of episodic memory. (Adapted
with permission from [30]).
Special Issue
R803behavior (Figure 1). Episodic memory
was described as memory for what
happened, where and when (WWW
memory) in food-caching scrub-jays
(Aphelocoma coerulescens), birds
that remember what foods they hid in which locations at
which points in time [8]. Comparative researchers have
developed analogous paradigms in other food-hoarding
species (for example [24]), in rodents [25], and in primates
[26]. Other behavioral paradigms for modeling aspects of
episodic memory in nonverbal species include memory for
temporal order [10], memory for the source of memories
[27], and planning [7,28].
Themany tests of whether particular species ‘show’WWW
memory equate to asking, ‘‘does species X have episodic
memory?’’ This approach can be problematic for several rea-
sons. Humans have many semantic memories that include
what happened, where it happened and when it happened,
such as knowledge of historical facts. We also have many
episodic memories that do not include all three elements
[29]. Surprisingly, when tests similar to the WWW tests
designed to model episodic memory in nonhumans are con-
ducted with humans, performance may not always depend
on episodic memory [6]. A more nuanced approach tests
the extent to which various species manifest different
aspects of episodic memory, and has many advantages.
First, we should expect memory to have evolved differently
in different species so as to match their cognitive capacities
to species-specific ecological demands, making a single
conception of episodic memory overly restrictive. Focus on
a single specific set of criteria can make it difficult to identify
interesting and informative species-specific specializations
in memory. Second, rather than simply rejecting behavioral
paradigms as ‘failures’ to demonstrate fully-developed
episodic memory if they do not meet a narrow definition,
studying different aspects of episodic memory across spe-
cies promotes new interesting areas of research to flourish.Third, considering episodic memory as a constellation of
mnemonic functions, rather than a single entity, may allow
us to make best use of studies of nonhumans to illuminate
the organization of memory more generally by identifying
commonalities and differences among memory systems
and across species. Studies of episodic memory in nonhu-
mans may allow reevaluation of the type of memory we call
episodic in humans and may better establish commonalities
among evolutionarily conserved memory systems.
What Is Mentally Represented in Episodic Memory?
The example of WWW memory shows how memories can
be encoded in a variety of ways. ‘When’ could consist of
different kinds of temporal information, from the time of
day at which an event occurred, how long ago an event
occurred, how strong a given memory is, to which events
preceded and which followed a particular event (Figure 3).
When monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were presented with trial-
unique sequences of images, it was the number of inter-
vening items, rather than passage of time per se, that most
strongly determined memory for the order of occurrence
[30] (Figure 2). Honeybees used circadian timing in a WWW
memory test, perhaps because they are obligate nectar
feeders and nectar availability follows a robust circadian
pattern [31]. Foraging decisions in rats often depend on
elapsed time, consistent with the finding that the perfor-
mance of rats in aWWW task was not controlled by circadian
time [25], and in a separate test depended on elapsed time
[32]. More recently, however, Zhou and Crystal [33] designed
a WWW experiment that prevented rats from using elapsed
time to guide behavior and found that under these conditions
the behavior of rats was controlled by time of day. Not
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Figure 3. Brain manipulations do not directly
identify cognitive mechanisms.
The lower panel depicts the fact that manipu-
lation of the brain, such as inactivation of the
hippocampus, may impair performance in a
given test, such as memory for the order of
events. The upper panel indicates that this
impairment might be caused by any of a vari-
ety of changes in the mental representations
responsible for performance. The combina-
tion of brain manipulations and sophisticated
cognitive testing is required to identify the
relationships between brain mechanisms
and cognitive representations. As described
in the text, different species may encode tem-
poral order differently, making independent
tests in different species necessary.
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encode time in different ways, some showing stronger paral-
lels to human episodic memory than others.
Memory Is for the Future
Episodic memory, like other types of memory, evolved not
for idle reminiscence about the past but because it promotes
adaptive action in the present and future ([5], p. 250). In
accord with this view, mental simulations of future events
in humans rely on the same neural systems responsible for
episodic memory [34]. Interest in the extent to which nonhu-
mans plan and otherwise anticipate the future has grown
with the development of studies of episodic memory.
Black-capped chickadees [35] and western scrub jays [36]
selectively chose which foods to cache so as to have access
to foods that will address anticipated motivational states,
even when currently satiated on that particular food. In
a related task, squirrel monkeys (Samiri scireus) altered
behavior in anticipation of future thirst [37]. Researchers
have begun to develop prospective memory tests to study
planning because prospective memory is proposed to
require encoding, retention, and retrieval of an intended
future action, as when we remember to buy milk on the
way home [38,39].
Recall and Recognition
Humans with episodic memory deficits are dramatically
impaired in tests of free recall, in which they are required
to recollect and produce, rather than simply recognize,
remembered material [2]. Nearly all memory tests used
with nonhumans are recognition tests but comparative
psychologists have begun to develop recall tests, and mea-
sures of recollection, for nonhumans. Several hours after
observing food being hidden in an outdoor enclosure, a
lexigram-trained chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) spontane-
ously requested to go outside, indicated which food she
wanted to locate by pointing to a lexigram keyboard, and
successfully directed a human to the location of the food
[40]. In a study paralleling the human ability to recall
and reproduce images from memory, rhesus monkeysreproduced simple shapes from mem-
ory on a touchscreen [41]. Analysis
of error patterns in rhesus monkeys
indicated the presence of both recol-
lective and familiarity-based memory
processes in recognition memory tests[42]. Recollective processes are associated with episodic
memory in humans [20].
Convergence of Cognition and Neurobiology
The most informative and exciting studies of episodic
memory combine sophisticated behavioral paradigms that
identify what information ismentally representedwith neuro-
biological manipulations or measures that identify the neural
bases of performance (Figure 1). The rodent studies of mem-
ory for order described earlier are good examples of such
studies [10,19]. Episodic memories are often encoded inci-
dentally and remembered when unexpectedly needed [29].
Rats reported correctly whether or not they had recently
found food, even under conditions in which they should not
have expected a test of memory. Availability of this appar-
ently incidental memory was abolished by inactivation of
the hippocampus [43]. As described in the introduction,
episodic memory encodes the context, or source, of mem-
ories. Rats with temporary inactivation of the hippocampus
could no longer remember whether they recently entered
the arm of a maze on their own or had been placed there
by an experimenter [27]. We have not mentioned many other
excellent studies combining important cognitive and func-
tional properties of episodic memory with neurobiology,
but have rather used these examples to foreshadow the
exciting studies we see ahead.
Gaps and Future Studies
Few cognitive studies of episodic memory in nonhumans
have sought to dissociate episodic memory from other types
of memory, although it is known that hippocampal lesions
dissociate memory for order from familiarity [10]. In partic-
ular the distinction between semantic and episodic memory
has not been extensively developed in nonhumans. Perfor-
mance in memory tests requires at least two kinds of knowl-
edge. The first is referencememory of the ‘rules of the game’,
such as that food can be found at the end of the arms of a
maze or that food can be earned by selecting the image
seen most recently. The second is often called ‘working
memory’ and is memory for what has happened recently,
Special Issue
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was seen at the beginning of the current trial ([5], p. 216).
Reference memory has properties of human semantic
memory, but the relations between human and nonhuman
semantic memory have not been the focus of anything like
the effort devoted to the study of episodic memory. It is
well-known in humans that no memories, even episodic
memories, are simple records of the past. Instead, memories
result from reconstructive processes, including interactions
between semantic and episodic memory [44,45]. We often
infer when our episodic memories were formed by reference
to semantic knowledge, for example by reasoning that we
must have conversed with our colleague two days ago rather
than yesterday because we were out of town yesterday. To
our knowledge, no studies of episodic memory in nonhu-
mans have directly addressed the extent to which non-
humans process episodic memories as embedded in
structured sequences of events analogous to humans’ use
of calendars and routines.
Some of the most comprehensive and exciting behavioral
data on episodic memory has come from studies of birds
[8,24] but there are no studies to our knowledge that
directly assess the neurobiology of episodic memory in
birds using lesion studies, physiological mapping, or neuro-
physiology. This gap may be due in part to the difficulty
inherent in evaluating the role of the hippocampus in
WWWmemory, given the well-established role for this struc-
ture in spatial memory in primates [46], rodents [47], and
birds [48]. It is difficult to distinguish a deficit in episodic
memory from one in spatial memory in any behavioral design
with a spatial component. This difficulty highlights the
need to avoid circular reasoning based on neurobiology
alone, for instance concluding that because a particular
behavioral performance is dependent on the hippocampus,
it necessarily involves episodic memory. Instead, it is critical
to determine the cognitive representations that control
behavior in a given test, and which components of this rep-
resented information are lacking following hippocampal
removal, for example.
Comparative and evolutionary studies should focus on
differences among species at least as much as similarities,
yet within comparative psychology and neurobiology it is
common to emphasize similarities. Identifying differences,
or specializations, in episodic memory between species
can allow testing of hypotheses about the evolution of mem-
ory. For example, highly social species may have evolved
episodic memory that is especially sensitive to the precise
social context in which memories were formed, enabling
sophisticated social behavior. By contrast, food-storing
birds that cache and recover perishable foods may be espe-
cially sensitive to the temporal context in which memories
were formed. Only comparative studies, conducted with a
broad conception of what episodic memory is, can identify
such differences if they exist.
Most modern taxonomies of human memory make a
fundamental distinction between memories about which
we are aware (declarative or explicit memories) and mem-
ories that are unconscious (non-declarative or implicit [49]).
Human episodic memories are explicit. Studies of metame-
mory in nonhumans, in which subjects show that they
‘know when they know’, suggest that at least some mem-
ories in nonhumans are also explicit. For example, monkeys
and apes chose to take memory tests in which they were
likely to answer correctly but declined memory tests theywere likely to fail. Some nonhumans also selectively seek
information only as needed before completing memory tests
(reviewed in [50]). Metamemory tests have not yet been com-
bined with studies of episodic memory in nonhumans, but
such approaches might be useful.
Conclusions
Advances in our understanding of episodic memory depend
on establishing robust dissociations between memory
systems based on the neurobiological systems serving
memory, the aspects of events mentally represented, and
in the kinds of transformations represented information un-
dergoes in the generation of behavior. As these character-
izations develop, we will be better able to compare and
contrast these systems across species, and to describe
the way these systems have likely evolved. By better under-
standing functional differences in memory among species
we will better know what episodic memory is. This knowl-
edge serves the basic science goal of understanding the
autobiographical memories that constitute our sense of
self, and the more practical need to appreciate which animal
models best capture which aspects of episodic memory for
biomedical research. We likely will never have satisfactory
answers to questions about the phenomenology of memory
in nonhumans, but we are making great strides in under-
standing what features of events are represented, where in
the brain, now.
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